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Splitting the Baby: An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s
Take on Customary International Law Under the Alien
Tort Statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court did something Solomon would
never have done—the justices split the proverbial baby.1 In June 2004,
the Court decided Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,2 a case initiated by a
Mexican national in a federal district court, partly based on claims
allegedly arising under the Alien Tort Statute of 1789 (ATS). The
complaints, based on the ATS’s jurisdictional language,3 forced the
Court to decide whether customary international law (CIL)4 could
provide the basis for a private action brought by an alien under the ATS.
Just as the baby in Solomon’s court had only one true mother, the answer
to whether CIL, within the framework of the ATS, provides a cause of
action in federal court should have only one answer, “Yes” or “No.”
While the Court did not say “Yes,” it also did not say “No.” Although
history, the Supreme Court’s own decisions, and U.S. tradition all
pointed to “No,” the Court split the baby and said, “In this instance ‘No,’
1. See 1 Kings 3:16–28. The story goes that two women approached King Solomon, each
claiming to be the mother of the same child. To solve the dispute, Solomon ordered that the baby be
split in two and one half be given to each woman. The false mother agreed to the proposal. Rather
than see her child killed, the true mother agreed to let the false mother have the baby. Instead,
Solomon gave the child to the true mother because, in his wisdom, Solomon knew that the true
mother would act so.
2. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
3. The jurisdictional language of the ATS grants federal district courts “original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort . . . committed in violation of the law of nations.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2000).
4. Customary international law has been described as follows:
International law, or the law of nations, consists of those rules and principles which
govern the relations and dealings of nations and of international organizations with each
other, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.
The “law of nations,” which is also known as “international customary law,” is formed by
the general assent of civilized nations. Norms of the “law of nations” are found by
consulting juridical writing on public law, considering the general practice of nations, and
referring to judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing international law.
45 AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 1 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
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but actually ‘Yes.’” As any parent can tell you, a split baby doesn’t last
long.
The facts giving rise to the case are remarkable and reflect poorly
upon the United States—a fact that may lend emotional, if not logical,
credence to why the Court was willing to leave open the possibility of
CIL applying to future cases.5 In short, the case arose after U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, acting without authority,
abducted Mexican national Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez) for his
alleged involvement in the torture and eventual death of a DEA agent.6
After returning to Mexico, Alvarez sought relief in U.S. federal courts by
invoking the ATS.
The issues that survived by the time the case wound its way to the
Supreme Court go to the heart of United States sovereignty. Alvarez
forced the Court to confront at least three fundamental questions
regarding the ATS’s stance on CIL: (1) What role, if any, does CIL play
in private actions under the ATS in U.S. courts? (2) Does the language of
the ATS granting that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”7 incorporate CIL and
create a fount of cognizable private actions? (3) May federal judges
apply international standards that have not been adopted, either expressly
or implicitly, by the United States?
This Note argues there are at least four reasons the Court should
have unequivocally held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that CIL cannot be
used to create causes of action under the ATS. First, the Treaty and
Offenses Clauses of the U.S. Constitution authorize only the President
and Congress to recognize and incorporate CIL into U.S. law. Second,
the ATS on its own terms merely grants jurisdiction and historically has
not been interpreted to create private causes of action. Third, using the
ATS to create such causes of action would violate the rule that there is no
general common law as established by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.8
Fourth, CIL may be arbitrarily and selectively used by judges wishing to
advance pet causes. To make this thesis as clear as possible, this Note is
divided into the following parts: Part II briefly describes CIL, the ATS,
5. See Part IV for a full discussion of why sovereignty concerns, the text of the
Constitution, and Supreme Court case law all militate against CIL being used as the basis for private
causes of action under the ATS, regardless of how heinous the underlying behavior.
6. See Part III for a more detailed retelling of the facts.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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the Treaty and Offenses Clauses, and Erie; Part III recounts the facts of
the Sosa case and the Court’s justification for allowing CIL to remain a
viable source of causes of action; Part IV analyzes Sosa’s take on CIL in
light of the Treaty and Offenses Clauses, the historical understanding of
the ATS, and Erie; and Part V addresses Sosa’s potential to alter the
United States’ fundamental constitutional sovereignty.
II. BACKGROUND OF CIL, THE TREATY AND OFFENSES CLAUSES, THE
ATS, AND ERIE V. TOMPKINS
Although the underlying thesis of this Note is straightforward—that
contrary to what the Sosa court allowed, CIL should not become a fount
of cognizable private actions under the ATS—the four arguments that
support it rely on the surprising interactions of CIL, the Treaty and
Offenses Clauses, the ATS, and Erie v. Tompkins. Before analyzing the
interactions of these arguments and their combined effect on the ATS, it
is important to have a working understanding of those concepts.
A. Customary International Law: Its Sources, Breadth, and Vagaries
Customary international law stems from the generally accepted
practices of countries in the international context—as recognized by
judges. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations defines CIL as the
law that “results from a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation.”9 It seems safe to view CIL as a
type of meta-law: it is derived from many considerations, including the
written laws of various countries, but no country’s written law is
determinative. Furthermore, it is not created by any legislature or
governmental body vested with lawmaking authority; rather, it is
judicially recognized and incorporated. This judicially recognized
customary source separates it from express international agreement—
treaty law—the other source of international law.10
Because CIL stems from informally created international custom, it
has the potential to influence every type of law in every country that has

9. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(2) (1987).
10. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 817 (1997) (“[T]here are
two principal sources of international law: treaties and CIL. Treaties are express agreements among
nations.”); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of Action, 1
CHI. J. INT’L L. 421, 422 (2000) (“There are two principal types of international law—treaties and
customary international law.”).
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international relations. CIL has already grown beyond its roots in
diplomacy and international relations.11 According to Professors Bradley
and Goldsmith,
Today . . . CIL also regulates the relationship between a nation and its
own citizens, particularly in the area of human rights. The scope of
these customary international human rights norms is unclear. There is
widespread agreement in the international community that CIL
prohibits acts such as torture, genocide, and slavery. Many
commentators argue that it also prohibits certain applications of the
death penalty, restrictions on religious freedom, and discrimination
based on sexual orientation. Others even contend that CIL confers
various economic and social rights, such as the right to form and join
trade unions and the right to a free primary education. The list of
putative CIL norms keeps growing.12

Because of its internationally subjective sources, CIL may strike
many U.S. lawyers as less-than-ideal grounds for a lawsuit; nevertheless,
it must be remembered that CIL has always played a role in U.S.
jurisprudence via the Treaty and Offenses Clauses. However, its
traditional costume has not been the Il Dottore mask in which the Court
dressed it in Sosa.13
B. The Treaty and Offenses Clauses and the “Law of Nations”
The Treaty and Offenses Clauses of the Constitution have
traditionally allowed customary international law a role in U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence. The Offenses Clause explicitly refers to
CIL’s forerunner, the “law of nations.”14 Inherent in the treaty power

11. Bradley, supra note 10, at 422.
12. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 818.
13. Il Dottore is one of the famous stock characters of classical Italian Commedia Del’Arte.
Dressed in black academician’s robes, Il Dottore was the hard-drinking, self-important, long-winded,
pompous fool who convinced everyone he was intelligent because he used lots of big words and had
an
advanced
degree.
See
Il
Dottore,
http://www.american.edu/
IRVINE/jenn/dottore.html. As will be seen in Part IV, Il Dottore seems an apt analogy for CIL
imported via the ATS—because of CIL’s potentially never-ending supply of arguments (“big
words”), CIL can be used to justify anything.
14. “Modern CIL descended from the ‘law of nations.’” Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10,
at 822. The term “law of nations” was used loosely by different eighteenth-century legal
philosophers. According to Professor Stewart Jay,
In its broadest usage, the law of nations comprised the law merchant, maritime law, and
the law of conflicts of laws, as well as the law governing the relations between states. At
times writers distinguished between the law of nations and the law merchant, but the law
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granted in the Treaty Clause, is the power to enter into treaties on
customary international legal grounds. Such explicit and implicit
recognition of customary law was likely necessary for the fledgling
nation, given the young country’s involvement with Europe.
The language of both clauses is simple. The Offenses Clause states,
“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o define and punish
. . . offenses against the law of nations.”15 The Treaty Clause states, “The
President shall . . . have power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.”16 Although the clauses either explicitly or implicitly recognize
power to ratify laws stemming from the “law of nations,” it is important
to understand what that term has historically meant.
The “law of nations” referenced in the Constitution was a limited
field with known parameters and ascertainable precedent—it was a term
of art referring to a discrete body of law. According to Blackstone’s
Commentaries, the “law of nations” as understood at the time of the
founding referred to “mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange . . .
in all marine causes, relating to freight, average, demurrage, insurances,
bottomry . . . [and] in all disputes relating to prizes, to shipwrecks, to
hostages, and ransom bills.”17 This largely merchant/nautical definition
of the law of nations fits with the largely merchant/nautical import of the

of nations always was understood to encompass what Justice James Iredell referred to as
the law governing “controversies between nation and nation.”
Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 821–
22 (1989) (citing Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of South Carolina (May 12, 1974), in
GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Philadelphia 1794)) (footnotes omitted). Although it would
appear from such definitions that the “law of nations” would not include customary law, Alexander
Hamilton argued in 1795 that
[t]he common law of England which was & is in force in each of these states adopts the
law of Nations . . . . Ever since we have been an Independent nation we have appealed to
and acted upon the modern law of Nations as understood in Europe.
. . . ‘Tis indubitable that the customary law of European Nations is a part of the common
law and by adoption that of the United States.
19 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 341–42 (H. Syrett ed., 1973). While it is likely that Hamilton
might not have agreed with the extent to which modern CIL has left the realm of international
relations and encroached upon the law defining personal liberties, see infra Part IV.D, his statement
does seem to indicate that custom as a source of law was a recognized element of the law of nations.
Thus, it is most likely that the Founders would have approved Congress using its power to base a
law defining an offense on unwritten custom.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
16. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
17. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *67.
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Offenses Clause.18 Blackstone also commented that, in the criminal
realm, the law of nations was limited to the crimes of piracy,
infringement of ambassadorial rights, and violation of safe conduct of
ambassadors.19 Finally, the law of nations, according to Blackstone, was
primarily concerned with offenses against entire states or nations, not
individual nationals.20
Although Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain never referred to the Offenses or
the Treaty Clauses, the history of these two clauses, particularly the
Offenses Clause, sheds invaluable light on the question of whether CIL
should be a source of rights of action under the ATS. Not only do these
clauses arguably run directly counter to the Court’s decision in Sosa, as
Part IV will show, their history is vital in understanding the true nature of
the ATS, the question that lay at Sosa’s heart.
C. The Alien Tort Statute of 1789
Lying at the core of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain was the question
whether CIL could serve as the basis for private causes of action under
the ATS. Part IV of this Note will analyze whether the Court answered
this question correctly. Before that, it is important to know the text of the
statute, a rough understanding of its history, and its place in modern law.
The First Congress enacted the Alien Tort Statute21 as part of the
first Judiciary Act. As originally drafted and adopted, section nine of the
Act stated that federal district courts “shall also have cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as
the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”22 The
statute went through various permutations, until in 2001 Congress
codified it in its current form. The ATS now states that federal district
courts “shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for

18. The entire clause reads, “The Congress shall have power . . . to define and punish piracies
and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.”
19. BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *68.
20. Id.
21. The Act is also commonly known as the Alien Tort Claims Act. See Ungaro-Benages v.
Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1232 n.7 (11th Cir. 2004); Flores v. S. Peru Copper, Corp., 343
F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42
VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 587 (2002).
22. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2000)).
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a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”23
The controversy that rages around this simple sentence has profound
implications. Although this controversy will be explored in Part IV, it is
important to understand the outline of the controversy in order to begin
to understand the Erie implications of Sosa. If the ATS’s reference to the
law of nations grants federal district courts power to entertain litigation
based upon uncodified notions of CIL, then the ATS is indeed a
formidable grant of common law power. However, if the ATS is merely
jurisdictional, then the reference to the law of nations does not grant
federal judges this power and they must wait for guidance from Congress
or the President via the Offenses and Treaty Clauses.
D. A Review of Erie v. Tompkins and General Common Law
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain has profound Erie implications. By
allowing CIL to be a possible source of causes of action, the Court has
arguably run afoul of one of the sacred truths of every first-year law
school course in civil procedure—namely, there is no general federal
common law. Although Erie is a classic case, a brief examination of its
factual and analytical bases will aid discussion of the implications
inherent in allowing CIL to serve as a basis of litigation under the ATS.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins was
truly a sea-change—it invalidated an entire body of law and an entire
method of analysis. Prior to Erie, federal courts were able to decide cases
based on general common law.24 In the absence of statutory direction,
federal courts were allowed to deduce rules of law based on general
notions of common law.25 These notions included everything from the
judges’ understandings of natural law theory and international custom to
the judges’ personal predilections.26 General common law was, as Justice

23. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
24. General common law included CIL. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 823.
Customary international law easily fit the general common law for one main reason—general
common law derived from no clearly defined source. Id.
25. Erie overturned the line of cases that developed from Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842). Swift and its progeny held that federal courts sitting in diversity could adhere at-will to state
court cases involving areas of unsettled law. Federal courts were to decide the issue for the state
using their own common law analysis. Id. at 18. The Swift analysis accepted the fiction that all
common law judges would reach the same conclusion if they merely used the correct common law
tools to discover the law.
26. As commentators have explained,
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Holmes acerbically stated, “a transcendental body of law outside of any
particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by
statute.”27 It might not be too far off-target to compare the ill-conceived
concept of general common law, given that it allowed federal judges to
create law from the ether, with the concept of substantive due process
typified in Lochner v. New York.28 However, with Erie, the ethereal,
transcendental, and politically powerful federal general common law
ceased to exist in federal courts.
In 1938, the Erie Court began the unequivocal dismantling of general
common law by stating that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is
the law of the State.”29 The case arose after an Erie Railroad Company
freight train hit and injured Harry J. Tompkins. Tompkins was walking
along a footpath that ran parallel with the tracks when he claimed to have
been hit by something projecting from the train. Tompkins sued in
diversity in Pennsylvania federal court, arguing that federal general
common law should apply because there was no applicable Pennsylvania
statute controlling the licensee/trespasser distinction. According to
Tompkins, under principles of general common law, he was a licensee
owed a higher duty of care because the railroad company knew that
people walked along that stretch of track. The Railroad company argued
that Pennsylvania case law applied and that Tompkins was a trespasser
owed a lower duty of care.30 Justice Brandeis, in three sentences, gutted
Tompkins’ argument: “There is no federal general common law.
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general’ . . .

Several theories supported this practice. Some courts applied CIL [and common law
generally] as an element of natural law. Others applied CIL as part of the common law
inherited from England. Yet others applied CIL as part of ‘our law’ or the ‘law of the
land’ without further explanation. Most decisions failed to identify any theory to support
the application of CIL.
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 822–23 (citing In re The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820); In re The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 388, 423 (1815); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815);
In re The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 297 (1814); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161
(1795) (Iredell, J.)).
27. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
28. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
29. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
30. Id. at 69–70.
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. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon
the federal courts.”31
In short, in diversity cases courts could no longer deduce general
notions of law in areas where state law was unresolved—they were to act
according to the laws existing in the state in which they sat. If the state
law was unresolved, they were to act as a state court would and resolve
the case according to the entire law as then understood in that state.32
The gist of Brandeis’ argument was that the common law’s only
valid source is the jurisdiction in which it is applied. Brandeis criticized
the general federal common law because it created “mischievous
results”33 and “introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens against
citizens.”34 According to Brandeis, “The common law so far as it is
enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the
common law generally but the law of that State existing by the authority
of that State without regard to what it may have been in England or
anywhere else.”35 Although this argument may render the common law
in one jurisdiction different from the common law in another, under Erie
the common law has to have a jurisdictionally correct and authoritative
source.36
With this basic understanding of general common law, the problems
with introducing CIL into U.S. law via the ATS should begin to become
apparent. Customary international law, much as the defunct general
common law, is judicially recognized. Justice Holmes’ statement that
general common law was a “transcendental body of law outside of any
particular State but obligatory within it,”37 is entirely applicable to CIL if
it is considered a legitimate source of U.S. causes of action.
With this background, it is now possible to turn to Sosa v. AlvarezMachain.

31. Id. at 78.
32. Id. (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the
law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern.”).
33. Id. at 74.
34. Id. Allowing federal courts to ignore state law, coupled with the disparate bodies of law
that developed, created great incentives for forum shopping. See id.
35. Id. at 79.
36. Id. (“‘[L]aw in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some
definite authority behind it.’” (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
37. Id.
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III. FACTUAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
There is an emotional element in Alvarez’s favor. He lived through a
nightmare that would enrage any U.S. citizen. He was forcefully
abducted from his home in Mexico by U.S. agents acting outside of their
authority. He was flown to the United States merely to get him within
U.S. jurisdiction so that he could be criminally prosecuted.38 In short,
U.S. officers kidnapped him. However, the emotional desire to quickly
punish and repay can lead to slipshod ideas with unexpected
consequences.
A. Historical and Procedural Facts Giving Rise to
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain was the result of many parties acting
rashly, if not illegally. The first bad actor was Mexican physician
Humberto Alvarez-Machain. In 1985, Alvarez apparently helped kill
Enrique Camerena-Salazar, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
agent. Camerena-Salazar was on assignment in Mexico when he was
captured and tortured to death during a two-day interrogation. Alvarez
reportedly worked to keep Camerena-Salazar alive during the torture.39
The second bad actor was the DEA. In 1990, a federal grand jury in
Los Angeles properly indicted Alvarez for the murder and issued a
warrant for his arrest.40 However, after receiving the indictment, the
DEA abandoned proper procedure and became more vigilante in its
efforts to bring Alvarez to justice. The DEA contacted the Mexican
government asking for help but never made a formal extradition
request.41 Mexico offered no aid. Despite the lack of extradition
procedures, and despite the Mexican government’s unwillingness to help,
DEA headquarters in Washington D.C. approved a plan to hire Mexican
nationals to abduct Alvarez and forcibly bring him to the United States.42
The third group of bad actors included Jose Francisco Sosa—a
former Mexican police officer—and a group of hired guns. The DEA
hired Sosa to lead the group in abducting Alvarez.43 As part of the deal,
38. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004).
39. Id. at 697; see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992).
40. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–98.
41. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2003).
42. Id.
43. Id. The unabbreviated chain of events leading to Sosa’s involvement is somewhat more
complicated:
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the DEA even agreed to use its influence to ensure that Sosa would
receive a position in the Mexican Attorney General’s Office.44 Under
Sosa’s leadership, a group of Mexican nationals abducted Alvarez from
his house, held him overnight at a hotel, and flew him in a private plane
to El Paso, Texas, where federal officers arrested him.45 The court battles
in the Ninth Circuit began soon after that.46
In his first court battle, waged while being held in the United States,
Alvarez argued that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the 1990 indictment against him.47 He argued that his seizure
was “outrageous governmental conduct” that violated the U.S.-Mexico
extradition treaty.48 Alvarez prevailed on this argument until the U.S.
Supreme Court held that his abduction did not affect federal court
jurisdiction.49 He was eventually tried and acquitted in 1992 after the
government failed to make its case against him.50 He returned to Mexico
after the trial.51
Alvarez then sought civil damages against his abductors. In 1993, he
sued Sosa, various DEA agents, and other Mexican citizens in Ninth
Circuit district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)52 and
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).53 The district court dismissed the FTCA
claims, but it granted Alvarez summary judgment on his ATS claims and
awarded him $25,000 in damages.54 In a three-judge panel decision, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the FTCA dismissal and affirmed the ATS
judgment.55 An en banc court affirmed the panel decision.56

The DEA agent in charge of the Camarena murder investigation, Hector Berellez
. . . , with the approval of his superiors in Los Angeles and Washington, hired Antonio
Garate-Bustamante (“Garate”), a Mexican citizen and DEA operative, to contact Mexican
nationals who could help apprehend Alvarez. Through a Mexican intermediary, Ignacio
Barragan (“Barragan”), Garate arranged for Jose Francisco Sosa . . . to participate in
Alvarez’s apprehension.
Id.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 658 (1992).
Id.
Id. at 669–70.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004).
Id.; see also Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 610.
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
Id. § 1350 (2000).
Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id.
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In affirming the panel decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the ATS
created causes of action arising under CIL. Citing cases such as AbebeJira v. Negewo,57 Kadic v. Karadzic,58 Xuncax v. Gramajo,59 and two of
its own decisions, the Ninth Circuit stated that the ATS “creates a cause
of action for an alleged violation of the law of nations.”60 However, the
Ninth Circuit was wary of the ramifications of this decision and
attempted to limit actionable violations of CIL norms to those “that are
‘specific, universal, and obligatory.’”61
Thus, after the Ninth Circuit finished with Alvarez-Machain v.
United States, it appeared the ATS was a source of CIL-based causes of
action. The decisions of the Ninth Circuit in the various appeals had been
consistent: Alvarez had been illegally hurt and must receive freedom and
damages. In both the criminal and civil cases, the Ninth Circuit’s
jurisdictional interpretations were fundamental in providing this aid: in
the criminal case it found a lack of jurisdiction so that it could send
Alvarez home,62 while in the civil case, the court found jurisdiction
enabling him to receive damages under the ATS.63 The Ninth Circuit’s
decision that the ATS granted jurisdiction, together with its application
of CIL, caught the Supreme Court’s attention. In December of 2003, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to “clarify the scope of both the FTCA
and the ATS.”64 Central to this clarification was the determination of
whether the ATS was merely a grant of jurisdiction, or whether its
reference to the law of nations incorporated CIL norms from which
plaintiffs could create original and hitherto unknown causes of action.
B. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
Sosa sports conflicting personalities despite the fact that it is, for the
most part, a unanimous decision. Although sections I and III garnered
unanimous approval, section II received the support of seven justices,
and six justices supported section IV. These numbers belie the decision’s
schizophrenia. Section I is merely a restatement of the facts giving rise to
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

1426

Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 641.
72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996).
70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 612.
Id. (citing In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 658–59 (1992).
Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 611–12.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 699 (2004).
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the case.65 Section II focuses on the scope of the FTCA and is irrelevant
to the ATS question.66 The confusion arises from section III, which
received unanimous support, and section IV, which received the support
of Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, O’Connor, and Kennedy.
These sections stand forcefully opposed to one another—section III
clearly states that the ATS is merely jurisdictional and is not a source of
causes of action, while section IV implies exactly the opposite.
1. The unanimous section III
After dealing with Alvarez’s FTCA claims, the Court turned to
Alvarez’s ATS claims. At the heart of the Supreme Court’s undertaking
was the determination of whether the ATS was merely jurisdictional. In
section III, the Court frequently stated that the ATS is merely
jurisdictional. For example: “the statute is in terms only jurisdictional”;67
“As enacted in 1789, the ATS gave the district courts ‘cognizance’ of
certain causes of action, and the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not
power to mold substantive law”;68 “The fact that the ATS was placed in
§ 9 of the Judiciary Act . . . is itself support for its strictly jurisdictional
nature”;69 and “[S]ection 1350 clearly does not create a statutory cause of
action . . . .”70 Thus, the history cited by the Court in section III supports
the view that the ATS language regarding the “law of nations” is not a
fount of liability based on CIL.
The Court grounded its interpretation of the ATS on the historical
meaning of the “law of nations.” Citing James Kent, the Court stated that
the law of nations at the time the Constitution was drafted primarily
“occupied the executive and legislative domains, not the judicial.”71 This
was because the law of nations was, at the time of framing, concerned
primarily with rights and duties that were part of international relations,
not personal rights.72 Judges had played an instrumental role in creating
65. Id. at 697–99.
66. Id. at 699–712.
67. Id. at 712.
68. Id. at 713.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 480 (1986)).
71. Id. at 714.
72. See id. at 714–15. The law of nations did recognize various personal rights, but these
were inextricably bound up with the larger concerns regarding international relations. Individuals
were punished for piracy, for infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and for violating safe
conduct. BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *68. Also, individual merchants could be held liable under
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the law of nations regarding “the conduct of individuals situated outside
domestic boundaries and consequently carrying an international savor.”73
In other words, judges created admiralty law as a part of the law of
nations, together with the three Blackstonian torts previously mentioned:
“violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors,
and piracy.”74 Thus, the law of nations was a definable, comprehensible
body of law, the violation of which—with the concomitant inability of
the confederacy to punish such violation—had caused the country great
embarrassment under the Articles of Confederation.75
2. Section IV
In section IV, the Supreme Court began by arguing for judicial
restraint, but ultimately abandoned the import of section III.76 Implicit in
the first paragraph of section IV is the assumption that federal courts may
entertain new causes of action based on CIL when the federal court
deems the asserted right important enough.77 Five pages later, the
implicit becomes explicit: “We think it would be unreasonable to assume
that the First Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all
capacity to recognize enforceable international norms . . . . [N]othing
the law of nations “in mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange and the like; in all marine
causes, relating to freight, average, demurrage, insurances, bottomry . . . [and] in all disputes relating
to prizes, to shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom bills.” Id. at *67, quoted in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
73. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
74. Id.; see also supra note 72 (describing the Blackstonian torts).
75. The Supreme Court refers to the so-called Marbois incident. In 1784, a Frenchman by the
name of Longchamps attacked Mr. Marbois, the Secretary of the French Legion, while Marbois was
visiting Philadephia. The Continental Congress called upon the states to address the issue but could
do nothing directly to provide a legal remedy. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716–17.
76. See id. at 724–38.
77. See id. at 724–25.
We think it is correct, then, to assume that the First Congress understood that the district
courts would recognize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the law of
nations, though we have found no basis to suspect Congress had any examples in mind
beyond those torts corresponding to Blackstone’s three primary offenses: violation of
safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. We assume, too,
that no development . . . has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a
claim under the law of nations as an element of common law; Congress has not in any
relevant way amended § 1350 or limited civil common law power by another statute.
Still, there are good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a federal court
should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind. Accordingly, we think
courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm
of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.
Id.
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Congress has done is a reason for us to shut the door to the law of nations
entirely.”78 According to the justices, the door could be opened when the
justices believed the claim at issue violated an international law norm
that was as definite and accepted among civilized nations as the
historical Blackstonian torts.79
To justify their position in this section, the six justices had to grapple
with Erie. Beginning with a laundry list of cases involving federal
common law,80 the six justices of section IV correctly recognized that
“Erie did not in terms bar any judicial recognition of new substantive
rules, no matter what the circumstances, and post-Erie understanding has
identified limited enclaves in which federal courts may derive some
substantive law in a common law way.”81 The Court proceeded to rely
upon The Paquete Habana82 and The Nereide 83 to justify the creation of
federal common law under the ATS.84 As will be argued later, these
cases were inappropriate and impotent justification because they were
based on notions of general federal common law that Erie eviscerated.85
As justification for its position in section IV of Sosa, the Supreme
Court relied on three more sources that deserve mention. The first was
the 1964 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino.86 The Court cited this case to support the proposition that CIL
could be invoked in “appropriate cases” under various federal statutes,
including the ATS.87 The Court also invoked the Second Circuit’s
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.88 In that decision, the Second Circuit held that
“United States courts are ‘bound by the law of nations, which is a part of
the law of the land.’”89 Finally, the Supreme Court in Sosa relied on the
statement in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the

78. Id. at 730–31.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 726.
81. Id. at 729.
82. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”).
83. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
84. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729–30.
85. See infra Part IV.C.
86. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
87. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729–30.
88. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
89. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
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United States that a “state violates international law if, as a matter of
state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones . . . prolonged arbitrary
detention.”90
Thus, at the end of Sosa, Alvarez-Machain was denied relief under
the ATS, but it is not exactly clear why. If the Court had stopped at the
end of section III, it would have been clear that Alvarez lost because the
ATS was merely jurisdictional and was not a fount of tort liability.
Section IV destroyed this clarity by leaving open the possibility that
Alvarez had lost because the Court could not agree that it was
appropriate to allow CIL to be a base of tort liability in this case—i.e.,
five justices didn’t think what had happened to him was really, really
bad. Section IV’s potential impact on U.S. jurisprudence should not be
overlooked or brushed aside. Instead, section IV should be seriously
critiqued for its Erie implications and for its potential to incorporate into
U.S. tort law via the ATS international practices that may be distasteful
to the U.S. populace.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF SOSA’S TAKE ON CIL IN LIGHT OF THE
TREATY AND OFFENSES CLAUSES, THE ATS, AND ERIE
Sosa is important because section IV leaves open the possibility of
international customary norms becoming judicially created law. While
the United States is a world power that cannot retreat to its old
isolationist Monroe Doctrine91 stance, it is its own nation with a distinct
set of ideals and morals, many of which may clash with perceived
international, or at least European, notions.92 Fortunately, despite the
Supreme Court’s reliance on cases such as Filartiga and The Paquete
Habana, U.S. law prevents judicially created CIL intrusions. It is the
90. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987)).

91. The Monroe Doctrine essentially required the United States to stay uninvolved with the
politics of other countries until those countries brought their politics to U.S. soil. See James Monroe,
7th Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1823), in A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS 778,
786–87 (James D. Richardson ed., 1911). Perhaps the most brilliant defense of the Monroe Doctrine
was the famous Clark Memorandum, authored in 1928 by Calvin Cooldige’s undersecretary of state,
J. Reuben Clark, Jr. J. REUBEN CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PUBL’N NO. 37, MEMORANDUM ON
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 1 (1928).
92. The recent Iraq war is a prime example of how U.S. politics, ideals, and goals may differ
drastically from the rest of the world—or at least Europe. This gap is illustrated clearly in a report
conducted by the Pew Research Center in March 2004. See Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the
Press, A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists
(Carroll
Doherty
ed.,
2004),
http://people-press.org/reports/
display.php3?ReportID=206.
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contention of this Note that Sosa’s take on CIL under the ATS (1)
violates the history of the ATS’s place in constitutional jurisprudence
and (2) runs afoul of Erie.
At least four arguments support this thesis: First, under the Treaty
and Offenses Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, historically only the
President and Congress are authorized to recognize and incorporate CIL
into U.S. law. Second, the ATS is purely jurisdictional. Third, using the
ATS as a source of tort liability would be to create general federal
common law violating Erie. Fourth, unscrupulous federal judges could
use CIL to arbitrarily and selectively advance pet causes.
A. CIL and the Constitutional History of the Treaty
and Offenses Clauses
The Supreme Court in Sosa gave short attention to the historical
place of CIL in U.S. constitutional law. As noted earlier, CIL was
incorporated under the name “Law of Nations,” into the Offenses
Clause.93 Furthermore, implicit in the power granted the President by the
Treaty Clause is the ability to enter treaties based on international
custom. The basic argument is this: because the Treaty and Offenses
Clauses grant to the President and Congress respectively the power to
determine the role of CIL in the American legal landscape, absent some
legislative or executive control, judicial implementation of CIL runs
counter to traditional notions of separation of powers, federalism, and
popular legal sovereignty in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence.94
Professor T. Alexander Aleinikoff made this argument plainly when he

93. See supra Part II.B.
94. By “popular legal sovereignty” this Note refers to the commonly held view that the law
applied in a country is somehow created by the government of that country at the behest of the
populace, free from the unwanted influence of foreign powers. Professor Richard H. Steinberg
defined “legal sovereignty” as
a set of attributes that constitutes the legal personality of a state. As a legal concept,
“sovereignty” is multidimensional. Domestically, law and philosophy have long
recognized the right of a sovereign to govern affairs within its territory and control its
borders. Internationally, recognized sovereignty has carried with it competence to
participate in the international system, conclude treaties on the basis of consent among
states, engage in international affairs on the basis of sovereign equality of states, and
exclude other states from interfering in internal affairs. The international dimensions of
legal sovereignty also imply a variety of corollary rights, and states vary in the ways their
constitutions protect legal sovereignty. Yet the legal personality of all states is uniform
and all states are legally sovereign.
Richard H. Steinberg, Who is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 329, 330–31 (2004) (emphases
added) (footnotes omitted).
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stated, “CIL, after all, is law that is not ‘made in America.’ . . . To
enforce CIL as a norm of the U.S. legal system is to subject Americans to
laws not of their own making.”95 However, although CIL is foreignmade law, the application of which may appear to be “un-American,” it
does, and always has, played a role in our constitutional system. An
examination of CIL’s historical place in the Constitution helps illuminate
the drastically different position taken by the modern Supreme Court in
Sosa.
1. Text and history of the Treaty and Offenses Clauses
The Constitution gives power to Congress and the President to
determine CIL’s place in U.S. jurisprudence.96 The Offenses Clause
gives Congress the power to define and punish offenses against the “Law
of Nations”97—the forerunner of CIL.98 Likewise, the Treaty Clause
allows the President to make treaties, as ratified by the Senate, that
explicitly adopt CIL norms.99 Even though the text of the Constitution
does not explicitly or implicitly give the judiciary power to hear offenses
against CIL that Congress has not defined,100 by granting the judiciary
95. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American
Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91,
101 (2004).
96. Whether Congress has plenary power to determine CIL’s place in U.S. jurisprudence is a
fertile source of conflict. This dispute will be discussed infra Part IV.B.2. The President’s power to
incorporate CIL into U.S. law via the treaty power has not spawned such conflict.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
98. See supra note 14 (quoting Alexander Hamilton and Professor Stuart Jay).
99. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
100. See infra Part IV.B.2. Although Professor Jay is correct in stating that “no provision of
the Constitution conclusively resolves any question about the extent of powers given by the
Constitution to Congress or the executive over matters touching on the law of nations,” Jay, supra
note 14, at 839, it seems clear, considering the historical records, that Congress and the executive
were to have complete substantive and procedural control over the impact of the law of nations
within the United States. For instance, Alexander Hamilton’s argument in THE FEDERALIST NO. 80,
at 498–99 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1902) shows that the Supreme Court was to have no power to
recognize new causes of action based on the law of nations without congressional consent and
direction. Hamilton clearly outlined the aspects of the law of nations that were critical to the
Framers. Id. As Professor Jay clarifies, “[Hamilton] never explicitly stated that Article III
encompassed the law of nations in its entirety. Moreover, Hamilton did not assert that the law of
nations fell under Article III’s jurisdiction over cases arising under the ‘laws of the United States.’”
Jay, supra note 14, at 830. The implication of this is that the law of nations had to be clarified and
defined before a U.S. court was competent to apply it because such laws did not exist of their own
force in the “laws of the United States.” Thus, if the law of nations was not part of the “laws of the
United States” that the judiciary had independent competency to define and implement, some other
body or bodies had to have the power to determine its place in the constitutional scheme. Congress,
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jurisdiction over all cases involving “Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls”101 as well as “admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction,”102 Article III confirms that the law of nations, including
CIL, is a part of U.S. law. However, given the plenary control granted to
Congress to define the law of nations and offenses against ambassadors
and other foreign officials, it is clear that this Article III grant of power is
dependent upon Congress’s definition of CIL—i.e., the Article III
language allowing federal courts to hear cases involving CIL is merely a
grant of jurisdiction, not substantive power.
The U.S. Constitution grants plenary control to Congress to “define
and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations.”103 This grant of
power did not spring full-grown into the Constitution. On August 6,
1787, the Committee of Detail presented a draft of the Constitution to the
constitutional convention.104 In that draft, Congress was allowed to
“declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting the coin of the United
States, and of offences against the law of nations.”105 Importantly,
Congress could only punish offenders of the law of nations, not define
the law of nations. On August 17, James Madison argued that Congress
be empowered to “define,” rather than “declare,” the law of piracies and
felonies, because “felony” was too vague a term and “no foreign law
should be a standard farther than is expressly adopted.”106 Madison’s
arguments prevailed, and the September 12 draft of the Constitution
stated that Congress could “define and punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and [punish] offences against the law of
nations.”107 Thus, the Constitution allows Congress only to punish
“offences against the law of nations,”108 and Madison’s argument
regarding piracy and felonies reveals that Convention delegates were at

by its structure, function, and textual grants, is the logical primary source with the executive coming
close at its heels.
101. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction.”).
102. Id. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
103. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
104. See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 176
(1966).
105. Id. at 182.
106. Id. at 316.
107. Id. at 595.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.

1433

6WILKINS.FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/21/2006 4:57:15 PM

[2005

least somewhat wary of transplanting international norms into U.S.
criminal law.
The final debates shaping the Offenses Clause show that offenses
against the laws of nations were to be defined solely by Congress. On
September 14, Gouverneur Morris successfully argued that the word
“punish” should be removed from before the phrase “offences against the
law of nations.” Doing so, he argued, would ensure that Congress would
be vested with plenary authority to both define and punish such
offenses.109 James Wilson argued, on the other hand, that doing so would
be inappropriate because the law of nations depends “on the authority of
all the Civilized Nations of the World,” and flouting those nations would
“have a look of arrogance that would make us ridiculous.”110 Morris
defended his position by stating that “the law of nations [was] often too
vague and deficient to be a rule.”111 After this debate, the Convention
approved Morris’s suggestion, and the Offenses Clause attained its
current shape: “Congress shall have Power . . . to define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against
the Law of Nations.”112 Commenting on the course of these debates, two
commentators have stated that the debates outlined above provide the
following insights:
First, Wilson’s objection demonstrates that members of the convention
understood that the law of nation[s] was derived by the consent of all
civilized nations, and was not created by a single country. . . . Second,
it must be noted that Gouverneur Morris’s reply showed that the law of
nations was considered to be too vague, and it was desirable to create a
more definite method to define the law than merely relying on the
consent of the “Civilized Nations of the World . . . . There was no
doubt the United States would have to function under the law of
nations, and it would therefore be necessary to have a clear definition
of what the law of nations was in order to function and adjudicate under
its terms.”113

The Convention’s understanding of the Offenses Clause was duly
represented to the states during the ratification period via the Federalist
109. FARRAND, supra note 104, at 614.
110. Id. at 615.
111. Id.
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
113. Richard G. Wilkins & Suzanne H. Curley, Defining Offenses Against the Law of
Nations: A Statutory Solution To Determine the Binding Effects of International Law 11–12
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Papers. Beginning with the broad recognition that national security
requires the federal government have plenary control over decisions
regarding the law of nations,114 the authors conclude that even members
of the House of Representatives, who are not as involved in foreign
affairs as Senators, “ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law of
nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation, is
submitted to the federal government.”115 Importantly, Madison described
this power as being a “proper object of municipal legislation.”116
Furthermore, Alexander Hamilton, who persuasively argued that federal
courts should have jurisdiction over cases involving the law of nations,
never intimated that the federal judiciary has any power to define the law
of nations.117 Thus, it seems relatively clear that the Framers of the
Constitution intended for the law of nations to be defined through
legislation. The Supreme Court would then apply the law as defined by
Congress—a textbook example of separation of powers.
Aside from constitutional text, early court cases indicated that the
law of nations has always been a part of U.S. law. In 1790, Chief Justice
Jay, riding circuit, instructed a grand jury that “[w]e had become a
nation—as such, we were responsible to others for the observance of the
Law of Nations.”118 Additionally, in 1987, the American Law Institute
stated that “customary international law in the United States is federal
law and its determination by the federal courts is binding on the State

114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 14 (John Jay) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1902). (“It is of high
importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all [foreign]
powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one
national government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct
confederacies.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1902). (“The
power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offenses against the
law of nations, belongs . . . to the general government. . . .”).
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 337 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1902).
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1902)
(“A distinction may perhaps be imagined between cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations
and those which may stand merely on the footing of the municipal law. The former kind may be
supposed proper for the federal jurisdiction, the latter for that of the States. . . . So great a proportion
of the cases in which foreigners are parties, involve national questions, that is by far most safe and
most expedient to refer all those in which they are concerned to the national tribunals.”).
118. John Jay, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York
(Apr. 12, 1790), in Jay, supra note 14, at 821–22; see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts
of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination.”). However, as will be seen, such broad statements, made in the
era of Swift v. Tyson, must be taken with an Erie grain of salt. See infra Part IV.C.
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courts.”119 Thus, as constitutional text and historical evidence make
clear, CIL does, and always has, played a role in U.S. law. Although the
statement by the ALI that CIL is federal law may be interpreted to mean
that CIL has already been entirely incorporated into federal law, there are
two reasons this interpretation runs aground: (1) as will be seen in the
discussion concerning Erie, the ALI has rejected the notion of such
whole-hog incorporation as set out in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala; therefore,
(2) CIL can be incorporated only via the constitutionally approved
method which would appear, at least textually, to be the method
described above. In short, it cannot be doubted that some CIL norms are
part of U.S. federal law, and that federal court judgments based upon
those recognized norms are binding upon the states, but the CIL norms
that federal courts do apply are defined by Congress. Therefore, CIL in
its entirety is not part of U.S. law.120 Only those parts explicitly adopted
through the representative republican system can give rise to cognizable
causes of action.
It seems most prudent, given the Supremacy Clause, that either the
President or Congress be vested with the gate-keeping power over CIL—
a position not allowed by the Sosa decision.121 As stated by Professor
Roger P. Alford, the traditionally appropriate methods for deciding
constitutional questions are analysis of “text, structure, history, and
national experience.”122 “Including a new source [such as CIL]
fundamentally destabilizes the equilibrium of constitutional decision
making. Using international law as an interpretive aid . . . ignores the
Supremacy Clause, which renders all of our laws subject to, and not
source material for, our Constitution.”123 Furthermore, if such a violation
of the Supremacy Clause were allowed, federalism would likely become
a word without meaning. If federalism means anything, it means that the
individual states in the U.S. have retained plenary control over those
areas they have not surrendered to the federal government via the
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111
n.3 (1987).
120. See supra note 100 (discussing FEDERALIST No. 80); see also infra note 149.
121. As will be discussed, the federal judiciary is poorly situated to play the gatekeeper in
questions regarding CIL’s place in U.S. law. Aside from the persuasive historical arguments that
appear to vest plenary control over determinations of CIL in U.S. law outside of the treaty context in
Congress, if a federal court uses CIL to recognize a cause of action, it is arguably running afoul of
the Erie doctrine. See infra Part IV.C.
122. Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources To Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J.
INT’L L. 57, 57 (2004).
123. Id. at 57–58.
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Constitution.124 If all of CIL is incorporated without legislative
consent,125 and if it is correct that the constitutional text vests plenary
authority to determine CIL’s effect in the U.S. with Congress and the
President, then the states have either been stripped of a significant piece
of sovereignty without consent or have somehow consented to give it up.
Although there are commentators and judges who argue that in drafting
the Constitution the states did give up all sovereignty in areas controlled
by CIL,126 this argument is ultimately self-destructive. If the states have
given up all control through the Constitution in areas affected by CIL,
what would have been the purpose of drafting a Constitution? By
allowing the possibility of future judicial incorporation of the entire
corpus of CIL norms into ATS cases, the Supreme Court in Sosa either
did not appreciate the magnitude of the potential infringement on
federalist structures, or it did not care. By so doing, the ATS has become
a potentially powerful tool for restructuring foundational constitutional
structures.
2. Sosa and the historical understanding of the ATS
124. See Federal Government, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (rev’d 4th ed. 1968).
In strict usage, there is a distinction between a confederation and a federal government.
The former term denotes a league or permanent alliance between several states, each of
which is fully sovereign and independent, and each of which retains its full dignity,
organization, and sovereignty, though yielding to the central authority a controlling
power for a few limited purposes, such as external and diplomatic relations. In this case,
the component states are the units, with respect to the confederation, and the central
government acts upon them, not upon the individual citizens. In a federal government, on
the other hand, the allied states form a union—not, indeed, to such an extent as to destroy
their separate organization or deprive them of quasi sovereignty with respect to the
administration of their purely local concerns, but so that the central power is both
external and internal—while the administration of national affairs is directed, and its
effects felt, not by the separate states deliberating as units, but by the people of all, in
their collective capacity, as citizens of the nation. The distinction is expressed, by the
German writers, by the use of the two words “Staatenbund” and “Bundesstaat;” the
former denoting a league or confederation of states, and the latter a federal government,
or state formed by means of a league or confederation.
Id.; see also Federal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (rev’d 7th ed. 2001) (defining the term federal
as “[o]f or relating to a system of associated governments with a vertical division of governments
into national and regional components having different responsibilities”).
125. As stated earlier, CIL has the potential to influence virtually every aspect of law, from
business incorporation to speed limits. See infra Part IV.D. Although speed limits may not be within
CIL’s historical ambit, the modern trend in CIL usage would tend to allow it.
126. See Jordan J. Paust, Domestic Influence of the International Court of Justice, 26 DENV. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 787 n.71 (1998); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.20 (2d Cir.
1980) (“[I]nternational law has an existence in the federal courts independent of acts of Congress is
the long-standing rule of construction.”).
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Although this Note has not yet addressed whether the controversy
regarding whether the ATS is purely jurisdictional,127 it must be noted at
this point that language in section III of Sosa, on its surface, appears to
run counter to the argument that the “law of nations,” as invoked by the
ATS, must be defined only by Congress. The Court states that “[t]here is
too much in the historical record to believe that Congress would have
enacted the ATS only to leave it lying fallow indefinitely”128 and that
there is every reason to suppose that the First Congress did not pass the
ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by
a future Congress or state legislature that might, some day, authorize
the creation of causes of action or itself decide to make some element
of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of foreigners.129

This Note contends that these statements do not legitimate federal court
action in creating new causes of action based on CIL.
The Constitution fundamentally altered the method of creating the
law of nations. While it is true that (1) the body of law known as the
“law of nations” was a common law creation, (2) Congress would not
likely have passed the ATS if it were to lie dormant indefinitely, and (3)
early courts applied the law of nations, via the ATS, as part of the
common law,130 the law of nations that was applied was clearly limited
and historically defined.131 Although federal courts used the ATS to hear
common law cases arising under the law of nations, such cases were
strictly proscribed by the historical meaning of the term of art “law of
nations.”
Thus, given that the “law of nations,” despite its partially judicial
source, was a defined body of law,132 once the Offenses Clause gave
Congress the power to define it, the Constitution invalidated the common
law method of expanding the law of nations. Furthermore, as the Court in
127. See infra Part IV.B.
128. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 719 (2004).
129. Id.
130. The Supreme Court cites specifically to the admiralty cases of Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.
Cas. 810 (No. 1607) (D.C.S.C. 1795), and Moxon v. Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (No. 9895) (D.C. Pa.
1793). See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720–21.
131. The law of nations as applied in this common law context did not include the ability to
determine damages. For instance, in the decision of Moxon v. Fanny, the federal court decided that
the ATS—and thus the law of nations—was “not the proper vehicle for suit because ‘[i]t cannot be
called a suit for a tort only, when the property, as well as damages for the supposed trespass, are
sought for.’” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720 (quoting Moxon, 17 F. Cas. 942).
132. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Sosa noted, “[W]e have found no basis to suspect [the First] Congress
had any examples in mind beyond those torts corresponding to
Blackstone’s three primary offenses . . . .”133 Finally, even if the
Constitution did not invalidate the common law method of creating the
law of nations, given Erie, it would be inappropriate for any federal court
to maintain that the early history of ATS litigation grants them the right
to entertain hitherto unrecognized causes of action.134
In sum, as the Supreme Court correctly stated,
[A]lthough the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of
action, the reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the
statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law.
[It] is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the
common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the
time.135

At this point, the Court should have concluded its analysis. The case
was decided—Alvarez lost. He had alleged that CIL forbade his
“arbitrary detention.”136 However, neither the original Blackstone torts
nor congressional statutory law included this as an actionable offense.
History, the Constitution, and Erie all favored stopping here, sending
Alvarez home, and leaving the definition of further CIL offenses up to
Congress. Prior to this point, the proverbial baby—i.e., the answer to the
question whether federal courts had the power to create new causes of
action under CIL—was whole.
In affirming the possibility that CIL may become a source of tort
liability via the ATS, the Supreme Court in Sosa rejected the historical
and textual view that Congress and the President have complete control
over the implementation of CIL norms in U.S. law. The argument could
be raised that Congress defined the law of nations by passing the ATS.
However, as will be seen in a later Section, to infuse the ATS with such
substantive meaning requires a torturous twisting of the ATS’s text.

133.
134.
135.
136.

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
See infra Part IV.C.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
Id. at 735–36.
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The ATS Is Purely Jurisdictional

The Supreme Court should have taken a deep, slowing breath before
investing the ATS with substantive powers. The ATS’s two-hundred year
existence belies its scanty use. According to Curtis A. Bradley, the ATS
“was an insignificant source of federal court jurisdiction during most of
its history.”137 In 1975 Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit said
that the ATS was “a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with
us since the first Judiciary Act . . . no one seems to know whence it
came.”138 Given this dearth of instruction, the Court should have taken
that steadying breath after reading the simple text of the ATS. The ATS
does not grant substantive powers to determine tort liability; it merely
grants jurisdiction. This position is supported by two arguments: (1) the
ATS, on its own terms, is merely jurisdictional, and (2) the ATS was
drafted by the same people who drafted the Offenses Clause. Thus, even
if the language of the ATS is vague, it seems unlikely that the same
people would grant to the federal judiciary via statute the power denied
the judiciary by the Constitution.
1. The ATS’s jurisdictional language and ambiguity
The relevant portion of section 9 of the ATS as drafted in 1789 states
that “the district courts . . . shall also have cognizance, concurrent with
the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be,
of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”139 This apparently
straightforward language, nestled in section 9’s multiple grants of
jurisdiction, has given rise to a heated debate concerning whether this
language, which still stands largely unchanged today,140 is as purely
jurisdictional as the rest of the Section 9 grants.141

137. Bradley, supra note 21, at 588.
138. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712
(citing Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015).
139. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, available at http://www.constitution.org/uslaw/
judiciary_1789.htm.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
141. The entire text of section 9 of the 1789 statute reads as follows:
And be it further enacted, That the district courts shall have, exclusively of the courts of
the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under
the authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts, or upon the
high seas; where no other punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine
not exceeding one hundred dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months,
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The alleged ambiguity of the language has resulted in two divergent
interpretations, both drawing on history for support: (1) the ATS is
purely jurisdictional; and (2) the ATS implicitly recognizes the federal
courts’ ability to recognize torts arising from “violation of the law of
nations.” For ease of understanding, this Note will refer to proponents of
the first interpretation as Jurisdictionalists, and proponents of the second
interpretation as Expansionists.
Jurisdictionalists argue that the ATS merely grants jurisdiction over a
separate legislatively defined group of claims.142 This jurisdictional
argument asserts that the term “law of nations” was a clearly understood
term of art defined by Blackstone in his Commentaries. They argue that
the term, in the civil realm, is limited to questions regarding “mercantile
questions, such as bills of exchange . . . in all marine causes, relating to
freight, average, demurrage, insurances, bottomry . . . [and] in all
is to be inflicted; and shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost,
navigation or trade of the United States, where the seizures are made, on waters which
are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within their respective
districts as well as upon the high seas; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a
common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it; and shall also have
exclusive original cognizance of all seizures on land, or other waters than as aforesaid,
made, and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United
States. And shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States,
or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. And shall also have
cognizance, concurrent as last mentioned, of all suits at common law where the United
States sue, and the matter in dispute amounts, exclusive of costs, to the sum or value of
one hundred dollars. And shall also have jurisdiction exclusively of the courts of the
several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls, except for offences above the
description aforesaid. And the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all causes
except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury.
The
Judiciary
Act
of
1789,
available
at
http://www.constitution.org/uslaw/
judiciary_1789.htm (emphases added).
142. Members of this camp include Justice Scalia, see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 743 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“The Court’s detailed exegesis of the ATS conclusively establishes that it is ‘a
jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action.’” (quoting the majority opinion, 542 U.S. at
724)); the Pacific Legal Foundation, see Brief for Pac. Legal Found. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (Nos. 03-339, 03-485), 2004 WL
177035, at *2 n.2 [hereinafter Pac. Legal Found. Brief] (“Amicus agrees with Petitioner’s arguments
that the ATS does not provide a cause of action given the absence of an express grant in the
statute.”); and Robert Bork, see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that reading statutes such as the ATS as creating causes of
action is “fundamentally wrong and certain to produce pernicious results”). See also MontanaDakota Utilities Co. v. N.W. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249 (1951) (“The Judicial Code, in
vesting jurisdiction in the District Courts, does not create causes of action, but only confers
jurisdiction to adjudicate those arising from other sources which satisfy its limiting provisions.”).
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disputes relating to prizes, to shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom
bills.”143 In the criminal realm, the law of nations was limited to the
crimes of piracy, infringement of ambassadorial rights, and violation of
safe conduct of ambassadors.144 This narrow definition of the “law of
nations” primarily concerns offenses against entire states or nations.145
Thus, because the term “law of nations” is clearly delineated in the
common law, to give it any other meaning would be improper.
Consequently, Jurisdictionalists argue that by using the term “law of
nations” in the ATS, the First Congress intended only to grant
jurisdiction over a discrete and limited body of law.
Proponents of this view argue that, on its face, the Constitution gives
the legislative and executive branches all substantive power over both
international relations146 and the impact of international law in the
United States.147 Central to this argument is the language of the Offenses
Clause granting Congress the power to “define and punish . . . Offenses
against the Law of Nations.”148 The Judiciary is granted no such
substantive power in the Constitution.149 Jurisdictionalists also rely upon
the Supreme Court’s statement in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. that
questions of international law and relations are entirely “committed by
the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—
Departments.”150 Jurisdictionalists also point to Erie as support for their
143. BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *67.
144. Id. at *68.
145. Id.
146. Among its many duties, Congress is entrusted with the following powers, which have
international scope: control import taxes, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.; regulate international
commerce, id. cl. 3; control naturalization procedures, id. cl. 4; establish post offices, id. cl. 7.;
declare war id. cl. 11.; raise armies id. cl. 12; and provide for a navy, id. cl. 13. The President is the
commander in chief of the U.S. military, id. cl. 1; and, has the treaty making power, together with
the Senate, id. cl. 2.
147. The President and Senate together have the power to bind America to international
treaties. Id. art. II, § 2 cl. 2; see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
148. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
149. The closest Article III comes to giving the judiciary the power to determine the effect of
international law within the United States is in section 2: “The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .” Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. While it has
been argued with some success that “the Laws of the United States” includes international law, see,
e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886–87 (2d. Cir. 1980); Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900); Nereide, 13 U.S. 388 (1815), these arguments fundamentally misunderstand the nature of
federal common law as set out in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Under the Erie
doctrine, it is much safer to take the Constitution at face value and vest Congress with complete
control over defining such offenses. See infra Part IV.C.
150. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
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argument that using the ATS to recognize judicially created causes of
action would amount to unconstitutional federal common law.151
Furthermore, jurisdictionalists argue that, because questions of
international law and relations are inherently political and “cannot with
any accuracy be completely ascertained, and defined in any public code,
recognized by the common consent of nations,”152 courts are inherently
ill-equipped to answer such questions. As the Pacific Legal Foundation
argued in its amicus brief in Sosa, “[T]he ‘law of nations’ must be
defined by someone. Both by explicit command and structural
imperative, the Constitution compels the conclusion that only Congress
should have this power.”153
Expansionists argue that the ATS implicitly recognizes the federal
judiciary’s ability to recognize new causes of action. This position is
clearly stated in Sosa.154 In that opinion, the Court stated that “other
considerations persuade us that the judicial power should be exercised on
the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms
today.”155 Advocates of this viewpoint often refer to early Supreme
Court decisions that interpreted the “law of nations” as including more
than the original Blackstonian torts.156 For instance, after making the
assertion that the door is still open under the ATS for judicial recognition
of previously unknown causes of action based on international norms,
the Supreme Court in Sosa quoted its decisions in The Paquete
Habana157 and The Nereide.158 In those decisions, dating from 1900 and
1815 respectively, the Court stated that the federal courts must hear and
decide causes of action not defined by Congress but sounding in the law
151. See infra Part IV.C.1.
152. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1163 (2d ed. 1851).
153. Pac. Legal Found. Brief, supra note 142, at *3–4.
154. 542 U.S. 692.
155. Id. at 729. See generally Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive
Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295; Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in
the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really
State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Jordan J. Paust, Domestic Influence of the
International Court of Justice, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 787 (1998). For more citations to
works outlining the Expansionist view, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 837 n.151.
156. See Brilmayer, supra note 155, at 301; Louis Henkin, supra note 155, at 1555.
157. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
158. 13 U.S. 388 (1815). Although the Court also cited Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981), this citation is particularly inapt in the ATS context because
the ATS is concerned with alien tort claims and Texas Industries dealt with “international disputes
implicating . . . our relations with foreign nations.” Id. at 641.
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of nations.159 As expressed by Curtis A. Bradley, proponents of this
argument suggest
there would have been no reason for the First Congress to create a
federal statutory cause of action for torts in violation of the law of
nations. The law of nations was considered at that time to be part of the
general common law, which could be applied by courts in the absence
of controlling positive law to the contrary.160

Interestingly, Expansionists also rely on Blackstone. They contend
that because Blackstone recognized international mercantile law to be a
valid part of private civil actions under the English common law, to
prohibit the courts from behaving as they traditionally behaved would be
anachronistic and unjustified.161 Because they believe Blackstone
included the law of nations as part of the common law, Expansionists
argue that courts do not need legislative approval to hear such cases.162
Thus, both sides look to history in support of their interpretation of
the ATS, and the differing interpretations of the same history suggest that
history alone is inconclusive. This Note now considers an additional
factor to help explain the ATS: the Offenses Clause. Close examination
of the Offenses Clause tends to show that Judge Friendly’s statement that
the ATS is a “legal Lohengrin”163 with no apparent roots fails when
considered in light of the events leading to the First Judiciary Act of
1789.
2. The ATS in light of the Offenses Clause
Because the Constitution and the 1789 Judiciary Act were passed
within one year of each other, and because constitutional framers were
also members of the First Congress, the debates regarding the Offenses
Clause shed light on the question of whether the ATS is more than
jurisdictional. It is difficult to believe that the views of the members of
the First Congress had changed significantly in the intervening months
159. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (“International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions
of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”).
160. Bradley, supra note 21, at 595.
161. See Brief for Professors of Fed. Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (Nos. 03-339, 03-485),
2004 WL 419425 at *12 (quoting Blackstone’s Commentaries regarding the application of
international mercantile law in private civil actions under the English common law).
162. See id. at *13.
163. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
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between drafting the Constitution and enacting the 1789 Judiciary Act. In
short, looking at the historical understanding of the Offenses Clause, it
seems unlikely that the ATS was intended to be anything other than
jurisdictional.
The debates regarding the Offenses Clause, the Clause’s final form,
and the clarifications provided by The Federalist Papers, make it fairly
clear that the Framers intended Congress to have sole power to define
offenses against the law of nations.164 If Congress was to have complete
control over the definition of offenses against the law of nations,
Congress would be constitutionally unable, absent an amendment, from
vesting such authority in the Court.165 Constitutional provisions cannot
be altered by normal legislative action; such alteration comes only by
amendment.166 Because the ATS was normal legislation, it could not
have altered the original meaning of the Constitution.
In passing the Judiciary Act of 1789, the First Congress was acting
pursuant to its constitutional power to vest judicial power in “such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”167 The Judiciary Act created the first federal court system by
establishing trial and appellate courts and jurisdictional bounds.168
In 1790, within a year of passing the ATS, Congress explicitly
exercised its Offenses Clause power and, based upon the law of nations,
passed a statute criminalizing piracy.169 This early and explicit use of
Offenses Clause power lends significant credence to the argument that
the ATS was meant to be purely jurisdictional. If the ATS were more
than purely jurisdictional, it would be unnecessary to pass a separate
statute explicitly criminalizing piracy—an offense so clearly understood
164. See supra Part IV.A.1.
165. Although Congress is allowed to vest limited legislative authority in executive
administrative agencies, see I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 (1983), Congress has no power to
vest such authority in Article III courts.
166. U.S. CONST. art. V; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
(“The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a
level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please
to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the
constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the
part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable. Certainly all those who have framed
written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,
and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature,
repugnant to the constitution, is void.”).
167. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
168. City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 836–37 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
169. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 113–14 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000)).

1445

6WILKINS.FIN.DOC

2/21/2006 4:57:15 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2005

to violate the law of nations that it is expressly mentioned in the Offenses
Clause of the Constitution.170
The upshot of all of this is that in Sosa, the Supreme Court should
have stopped after finishing section III. In that section, the Court
correctly ascertained that the ATS was merely jurisdictional. History,
text, and practice all required that the ATS remain a jurisdictional grant.
However, even if the Court were able to prove that the ATS is
substantive, it still should have denied the claim that the ATS is a viable
fount of tort liability for the simple reason that Erie forbids it.
C. Sosa and Erie v. Tompkins
Viewing the ATS as allowing courts to hear cases arising out of
customary international law without congressional or executive
guidance, as the Court did in Sosa, requires turning a blind eye to Erie v.
Tompkins.171 The trend during the mid-twentieth century appears to have
been to allow federal courts to apply CIL as part of the federal common
law, a valid body of law even under Erie.172 However, according to Erie
170. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
171. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
172. Although beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to be familiar with the basic
justifications given for allowing federal courts to treat CIL as federal common law. The two most
influential justifications come from a judicial decision out of the Second Circuit, and the American
Law Institute’s RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES.
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), the court held that “United States
courts are ‘bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law of the land.’” Id. at 887 (citing
The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815)). While this decision, delivered forty-two years
after Erie, would seem to disprove the thesis that CIL is not federal common law, the Second
Circuit’s decision is fundamentally flawed. The case arose out of a conflict between Paraguayan
citizens. A group of Paraguayans sued another Paraguayan for acts of torture committed in Paraguay
under color of Paraguayan law. Id. at 878. The plaintiffs sued the defendant in U.S. district court,
claiming that CIL prohibited such torture. The plaintiffs argued that the ATS granted jurisdiction
because the statute gave all federal district courts jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a
tort . . . committed in violation of the law of nations.” Id. at 880. The Second Circuit’s opinion
turned on this threshold question of jurisdiction. The Second Circuit based its decision on The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). Id. (“The Paquete Habana . . . reaffirmed that where there is
no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations.” (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700)).
However, as will be seen, the reference to The Paquete Habana was inappropriate. The Paquete
Habana was a decision based on notions of general common law that Erie conclusively rejected. In
short, The Paquete Habana dealt with a now-extinct area of law and holds no modern precedential
value.
The American Law Institute has also stated that “International law . . . [is] law of the United
States and supreme over the law of the several States.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 111(1) (1987). In the comments to section 111, the
reporters note that “[c]ustomary international law is considered to be like common law in the United

1446

6WILKINS.FIN.DOC

1415]

2/21/2006 4:57:15 PM

Customary International Law in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain

and its progeny, incorporating CIL via the ATS would be an exercise not
in valid federal common law, but in the invalid general federal common
law. Thus, CIL would only be a viable source of tort law if the
limitations placed on federal common law are reversed and the Court
returns to the Swift v. Tyson days of general federal common law.
1. General federal common law versus federal common law
Although Erie gutted general federal common law, federal courts
may apply federal common law interstitially. Because Erie requires that
law come from a domestic sovereign source, federal courts may make
common law only if authorized to do so.173 Today, authorization exists
for federal courts to create common law in areas including: ERISA
litigation,174 labor-management disputes,175 litigation between states,176
and in litigation involving the acts of foreign countries.177 Although
much of this federal common law stems from gaps in statutory language,
the Court has explicitly held that federal common law cannot be used to
create private rights of action absent affirmative evidence of
congressional intent that the courts do so.178
No current law, constitutional or statutory, affirmatively grants
federal courts free rein to create federal common law based on CIL. As
has been argued before, Articles I and II grant to Congress and the
States, but it is federal law. A determination of international law by the Supreme Court is binding on
the States and on State courts.” Id. § 111 cmt. d. Thus, the Restatement states, in a roundabout
manner, that CIL is federal common law binding on the states. Unfortunately, the ALI cited no
authority for this position and seems to have “bootstrapp[ed]” its argument together based on
similarly unsupported statements in essays written by the Chief Reporter. Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 10, at 836. Furthermore, the ALI did not invoke Filartiga because it rested on
inappropriate nineteenth-century precedent.
Filartiga and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) have been referred to as the two pillars of the view
that CIL is federal common law. Id. at 834. Interestingly, these two pillars conflict because the ALI
specifically rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning. Nevertheless, they are the two most oft-invoked
justifications for expanding federal court power under CIL. For an in-depth critique of these
justifications, see id. at 831–37.
173. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION ch. 6 (4th ed. 2003); see also Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 856 (“Courts and scholars generally agree that federal common law
must be authorized in some fashion by the Constitution or a federal statute.”).
174. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
175. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
176. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
177. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). For a more complete
summary of areas in which federal courts are authorized to create federal common law, see
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 173 at 362–89.
178. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
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President sole power to determine CIL’s position in U.S. law.179
Congress and the President control the issue and have not been slack in
using their constitutionally granted power.180 However, neither the
President nor “Congress [have ever] purported to incorporate all of CIL
into federal law.”181 Furthermore, as Bradley and Goldsmith argue,
“selective incorporation would be largely superfluous if CIL were
already incorporated wholesale into federal common law.”182 Therefore,
except for the specific cases when Congress through statute, or the
President through duly ratified treaty, has granted federal courts common
law power based on CIL, there is no evidence of a general grant of
common law power in areas affected by CIL.
Finally, there is no case law consistent with the Erie doctrine that
allows federal courts federal common law power regarding CIL.
Relatively recent court decisions to the contrary, such as Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, which often invoke The Paquete Habana183 and The
Nereide184 as justification for whole-sale incorporation of CIL into
federal law, fail to consider that those cases made that determination
based on a subsequently discredited system of law.185 The impropriety of
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 857.
182. Id.
183. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
184. 13 U.S. 388 (1815).
185. The Supreme Court decided The Paquete Habana after the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida condemned two Cuban fishing vessels, the Paquete Habana and the
Lola, as prizes of war. Both vessels were unarmed fishing boats owned by Cuban nationals who
were not aware of the naval blockade, and both ships lost their cargo of fish. The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. at 678–79. The question, as framed by the Supreme Court, was whether “the fishing
smacks were subject to capture by the armed vessels of the United States during the recent war with
Spain.” Id. at 686. Although the answer the Court reached appeared to be the only truly just decision
(that the condemnations were wrong), the method the Court used to get there was only appropriate
under a system countenancing general common law. The Court’s answer to this question made
liberal use of international sources such as 2 ORTOLAN, REGLES INTERNATIONALES ET DIPLOMATIE
DE LA MER (4th ed.); 4 CALVO, DROIT INTERNATIONAL (5th ed.); BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTIONES
JURIS PUBLICAE; and CLEIRAC, US ET COUTUMES DE LA MER, together with its personal exegeses of
English fishing law under Henry IV in 1403 and French fishing law under Louis XVI in 1779. The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686–700. The only controlling U.S. precedent that appears to have
influenced the Court were the decisions in Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890), and
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 696. However,
these decisions deal with extending U.S. criminal jurisdiction over islands discovered by U.S.
citizens and the power of a federal court to review the political acts of sovereign nations
respectively. They were also decided under the general common law scheme. The Supreme Court’s
scant use of U.S. law in deciding The Paquete Habana can be justified only under a general common
law system that allowed such rambling use of non-U.S. precedent. See supra note 27 and
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a modern court relying on The Paquete Habana in cases involving
alleged violations of CIL is almost indistinguishable from the
impropriety of a modern court relying on Dred Scott v. Sandford186 in
cases involving racial categories—use of either decision is illogical, illconceived, and illegitimate in modern jurisprudence. Although Dred
Scott and its issues stir up more visceral reactions than The Paquete
Habana’s relatively dry jurisdictional concerns, the logical fallacies
underlying both cases—such as a judge’s unfounded personal “take” on
the issue187—are similar and improper. Even the American Law
Institute, one of the major proponents of CIL as federal common law,
recognizes this.188 Customary International Law cannot be federal
common law unless we are willing to abandon Erie and return to the
caprices of general common law.189

accompanying text (regarding how general common law worked). Although the outcomes in The
Paquete Habana, Jones, and Underhill may have been “right,” and although the current Court might
decide similarly if the cases arose today, the method of reaching those outcomes—via some sort of
grant of power from Congress or the President—would be fundamentally different.
186. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
187. Dred Scott was nothing if not unfounded. In a futile attempt to justify racial
classifications, Chief Justice Taney propounded the idea that the Constitution permitted creating two
classes of human, one of which was not to receive the rights granted to the other. Although the
Constitution (1) contains the infamous Fugitive Slave Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2, cl. 3; (2)
protected slavery until 1808, id. art. 1, § 9, cl. 1; and (3) counted slaves as three-fifths of white
people for taxation and representation, id. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. Taney’s statement in Dred Scott that the
Constitution creates multiple classes of citizens has gone down in history as unfounded and
politically motivated. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 36–37 (1975) (“A
majority of the Supreme Court seized on the concept of citizenship in the Dred Scott case, in a futile
and misguided effort, by way of a legalism and an unfounded legalism at that, to resolve the
controversy over the spread of slavery.”); Robert Meister, Sojourners and Survivors: Two Logics of
Constitutional Protection, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 121, 130 (1996) (criticizing the
antebellum logic of John Codman Hurd, Meister states, “His treatise was thus an indirect answer to
Lincoln’s ‘house divided’ speech, and also to Taney’s unfounded assumption in Dred Scott that to
exist anywhere in the United States slavery must be recognized everywhere in the United States.”);
Eric J. Mitnick, Three Models of Group-Differentiated Rights, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215,
238 (2004) (“In virtue of some rather abrupt and tortured logic, Taney first equated the rarely
invoked constitutional investitive standard of citizenship with the broader and clearly distinct
investitive norm of personhood: ‘The words “people of the United States” and “citizens” are
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing.’ . . . Taney, of course, concluded that constitutional
rights, even those ostensibly afforded to ‘persons’ merely as such, did not apply to members of ‘that
unfortunate race . . . so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect.’ Hence, all individuals of African descent were ascriptively excluded from the class of
‘persons’ deemed competent to bear rights.”).
188. See supra, note 119 and accompanying text.
189. Interestingly, general common law was not binding upon the states and alone did not
establish federal question jurisdiction. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1276–92 (1996). Thus, even if general common law
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2. Erie as misapplied in Sosa
The Supreme Court’s ability to overlook Erie in its analysis of Sosa
is troubling. If the Court wants to overturn Erie, it should simply say so.
If the Court is unaware of Sosa’s Erie implications, it is time for
someone to enlighten the Justices. One can hope that the Court’s analysis
in Sosa was an innocent misstep. This hope is strengthened by the fact
that the Ninth Circuit had previously taken the same misstep. Perhaps the
Supreme Court was merely following California’s lead.
By the time the Supreme Court decided Sosa, federal courts had a
history of ignoring the Supreme Court’s Erie implications. Most
importantly, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning ran fatally afoul of Erie. The
decisions upon which the Ninth Circuit relied are based on the Second
Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. As has been discussed,190
Filartiga was based on a body of general common law that Erie
disemboweled. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on these cases was
fundamentally misplaced. The Ninth Circuit seems to have realized this
weakness because it cited other circuit decisions merely to establish that
the ATS “has been invoked in a variety of actions alleging human rights
violations,”191 not to prove that the ATS gives rise to causes of action.
On first reading, it appears that the court is citing these cases as support
for its position, when, in fact, one of the cases, the D.C. Circuit’s per
curiam opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,192 refutes the Ninth
Circuit’s decision.193

precedent such as The Paquete Habana were still good law, the argument could be made that CIL
would be applicable only in the federal arena. Such an argument would probably not please
advocates of applying CIL domestically because, given the personal rights that CIL potentially
covers, proponents of nonfederal application of CIL would have to define what they believe to be the
extent of state police powers. In order for international norms to give rise to personal nonfederal
causes of action under this scheme, the Supreme Court would have to drastically prune traditional
state police power. Such a decision would raise public outcry that would likely result in a stringent
restriction of the domestic application of CIL norms—not the result proponents would like.
However, such a situation is speculative and mostly academic for the simple reason that Erie
invalidated the precedential value of general common law CIL cases, despite the Second Circuit’s
contrary assertions in Filartiga.
190. See supra, Part IV.C.1.
191. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 611 (9th Cir. 2003).
192. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
193. Judge Bork’s concurrence is particularly illuminating:
Appellants, seeking to recover for a violation of international law, might look to federal
statutes either for a grant of a cause of action or for evidence that a cause of action exists.
These notions may be quickly dismissed. The only plausible candidates are the two
jurisdictional statutes relied on by appellants, sections 1331 and 1350 [the ATS] of Title

1450

6WILKINS.FIN.DOC

1415]

2/21/2006 4:57:15 PM

Customary International Law in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain

Apparently taking its lead from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court
merely exacerbated the Erie problems. The Court inappropriately
cloaked its analysis in section IV in the robes of Erie and fundamentally
misinterpreted the law regarding the appropriate creation of federal
common law. Beginning with a laundry list of cases involving federal
common law,194 cases that would tend to argue against the Court’s
ultimate decision in Sosa, the six justices of section IV correctly
recognized that “Erie did not in terms bar any judicial recognition of new
substantive rules, no matter what the circumstances, and post-Erie
understanding has identified limited enclaves in which federal courts
may derive some substantive law in a common law way.”195 Using this
precedent as justification, the Court proceeded to rely upon The Paquete
Habana and The Nereide to justify the creation of federal common law
under the ATS.196
Furthermore, in its efforts to make its Erie position legitimate, the
Court relied on and misconstrued Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino.197 In that case, the Court held that the act of state doctrine
prevented prosecution despite violations of CIL. Consequently, the Court
decided that it would not act without a guiding treaty or “other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles.”198
Although the language of Sabbatino does not explicitly state that a
federal court may not invoke CIL under the ATS, the Court’s
unwillingness in Sabbatino to apply CIL absent a treaty runs counter to
the Court’s willingness to incorporate CIL via the ATS in Sosa. The
Court acknowledged this fact in a footnote, arguing that Sabbatino, while

28 of the United States Code. Neither of those statutes either expressly or impliedly
grants a cause of action. Both statutes merely define a class of cases federal courts can
hear; they do not themselves even by implication authorize individuals to bring such
cases. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he Judicial Code, in vesting jurisdiction in
the District Court, does not create causes of action, but only confers jurisdiction to
adjudicate those arising from other sources which satisfy its limiting provisions.”
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 811 (Bork, J., concurring) (emphases added) (quoting Montana-Dakota Utils.
Co. v. N.W. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249 (1951)).
194. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004).
195. Id. at 729.
196. Id. at 730.
197. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
198. Id. at 428 (“[W]e decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a
taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized
by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement
regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates
customary international law.”).
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not ultimately applying federal law, did not “question the application of
that law in appropriate cases.”199 However, once again, the Court’s
refusal in Sabbatino to apply CIL absent a treaty or other binding
guidelines argues strongly against federal court application of CIL norms
that Congress has not defined, no matter how “appropriate” it may be.
Furthermore, the Sosa Court never supplied the standard of propriety for
making the determination. Ad hoc judicial determinations of propriety
are tricky things—just ask Joseph Lochner.
Aside from the subtle logical blunder of relying on Sabbatino, the
Court made a more egregious blunder in its reliance on Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala. Although this Second Circuit decision supports the Court’s
decision and has been favorably cited in several other jurisdictions,200 it
is important to remember that the Second Circuit in Filartiga, like the
Supreme Court in Sosa, relied on defunct precedent, including The
Paquete Habana—precedent that Erie made inapplicable.201 The Court
confounds this problem by relying on the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States in its discussion of the validity of
Alvarez’s arbitrary detention claims.202 The Court seems to have
conveniently ignored the fact that the Restatement has disavowed the
reasoning of Filartiga as inappropriate in the post-Erie context.203
Despite the fact that Filartiga and the Restatement proceed from
drastically different and mutually exclusive underpinnings, the Court
inexplicably invokes both as validation for its position.
Allowing a federal court to apply CIL when “appropriate” to create
federal common law would give federal judges a potentially vast and
arbitrary discretion. Determining just what constitutes a CIL norm is an
inherently political decision that can easily, if not authoritatively, be
justified by selective reference to international currents.204 Furthermore,
such power could be used in any area from whaling regulations to
marriage rights.205 Granting federal courts, and the Supreme Court in
particular, such power would prove Justice Scalia right: the Supreme

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
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Court would have the logical ability to be involved in everything.206 The
fact that the Supreme Court held that Alvarez’s claim ultimately was not
a sufficiently established CIL norm to warrant creating a federal cause of
action207 is cold comfort to those who are concerned not only about
outcome, but the process as well. The process the Court used in reaching
its decision in Sosa is frightening.
D. Potential Consequences of Incorporating CIL into U.S. Law
via the ATS or Other Statutes
Customary international law may be compared to Procrustes’ bed:208
advocates can, with enough violence, force any issue to fit within its
confines. Because CIL evades clear definition, the United States should
be careful in adopting CIL norms as grounds for causes of action unless
those norms have been explicitly adopted by the U.S. Congress.209 Given

206. “This Court seems incapable of admitting that some matters—any matters—are none of
its business.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. The standard the Court elucidated for determining if a CIL norm was sufficiently
established as to constitute a judicially created cause of action required that “federal courts should
not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm
with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when § 1350 was enacted.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. As a side note, it is interesting that the
justices decided that only the actions of “civilized nations” should be taken into account when
making this determination. What constitutes “civilized” behavior is relative and intimately tied to
cultural understandings. However, the term “civilized” was more politically correct than what the
Court desired to say. Based on what the Court used to determine whether “arbitrary detention”
constituted a well-established CIL norm among “civilized” nations (U.S. case law, the European
Commission’s amicus brief, the Torture Victim Protection Act, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law and various U.S. law review articles), what the Court really appears to have meant
was, “[w]hat constitutes a well-established CIL norm among western/European countries?”
However, if CIL is an appropriate analytical tool, we must forgive the Court for making such a
Eurocentric decision—after all, determining what customary international (not just European) norms
are is a difficult (if not impossible) determination to make.
208. In Greek myth, the hero Theseus had to defeat the villain Procrustes. Procrustes was
famous for having a magical bed that perfectly fit anyone who slept on it. The “magic” was, to say
the least, a let down. Procrustes would kidnap victims and force them to lie on the bed. He would
then either stretch the unfortunate guest or cut off his limbs to make him fit the bed. See MAX J.
HERZBERG, MYTHS AND THEIR MEANING 150 (1984).
209. See supra Part IV.C. Although the term “Customary International Law” does not appear
anywhere in the Constitution, the Offenses Clause does give Congress the power to define and
punish offenses against the “Law of nations.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. At the time of the
founding, the term “law of nations” was the equivalent of the modern term “CIL.” Bradley, supra
note 10, at 422. As this Note has shown, the debates concerning the Offenses Clause during the
Constitutional Convention show that Congress was to have complete control over implementation of
CIL in U.S. law. See supra Part IV.A.
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the breadth and vagaries of CIL, its incorporation into U.S. law should
give those affected pause. If judges are deemed competent to hear cases
arising from CIL that has not been defined by Congress or the President,
the judges might use CIL as a thin legal pretext for having the final say
in personal political issues—the power to define the contours of
international customary law, not merely apply it, is inherently political.
Examples of the United States Supreme Court using CIL as partial
justification for its conclusions in politically charged decisions include
Atkins v. Virginia210 and Lawrence v. Texas.211 In Atkins, the Court was
faced with the question of whether it is constitutional to execute the
mentally retarded.212 The European Union filed an amicus brief, arguing
that there was general global consensus against such punishment. The
Court ultimately agreed, basing its opinion on what one commentator has
called a “majoritarian paradigm” in determining if a punishment meted
out in the U.S. is “cruel and unusual punishment.”213 However, Justice
Stevens did note the E.U.’s amicus brief as supporting authority.214 In
like manner, in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy referred to the values of a
shared “wider civilization” that argued in favor of overturning Bowers v.
Hardwick,215 the Supreme Court decision upholding a state’s right to
criminalize consensual sodomy.216 Although this Note is not concerned
with the correctness of either of these decisions, the procedural
invocation of international norms in their decisions is cause for concern.
Using international norms to recognize hitherto unknown causes of
action not approved by Congress raises at least three concerns.

210. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
211. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
212. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307.
213. Alford, supra note 122, at 60.
214. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (“Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of
the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved.”).
215. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
216. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576–77 (“To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a
wider civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected
elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom. See P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98, ¶ 56 (Eur.
Ct. H.R., Sept. 25, 2001); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (1988). Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected
right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct . . . . The right the petitioners
seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries.
There has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal
choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.”).
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According to Professor Roger P. Alford, the first concern arises when
global opinions thwart domestic opinions in constitutional
interpretation.217 Although there is debate over the propriety of using
community value judgments in constitutional interpretation,218 Professor
Alford clearly states,
To the extent that value judgments are a source of constitutional
understandings of community standards, the hierarchical ranking
of relative values domestic majoritarian judgments should hold
sway over international majoritarian values. Using global
opinions as a means of constitutional interpretation dramatically
undermines sovereignty by utilizing the one vehicle—
constitutional supremacy—that can trump the democratic will
reflected in state and federal legislative and executive
pronouncements.219
Both Lawrence and Atkins are prime examples of this international
countermajoritarian problem. In both cases, the Court used international
opinions as partial justification for reaching decisions that arguably ran
counter to the opinions of a large plurality, if not a majority, of
Americans. Aside from the indeterminacy of CIL norms, constitutional
interpretation based on a court’s diagnosis of the international pulse is
inappropriate because it strikes at the core of federalism by abusing
federalism’s underlying tenet that some powers are specifically reserved
to the states.220
The second and third concerns that applying CIL norms without
congressional direction create are related: (1) haphazard use, and (2)
selective use. Although Justice Breyer may be correct in arguing that
international law “cast[s] an empirical light on the consequences of
different solutions to a common legal problem,”221 the difficulty comes
217. There are those who fervently believe that U.S. values that are out of sync with world
opinion should be discarded. Professor Alford quotes Harold Hongju Koh who wrote, “The evidence
strongly suggests that we do not currently pay decent respect to the opinions of humankind in our
administration of the death penalty. For that reason, the death penalty should, in time, be declared in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Alford, supra note 122, at 58 n.12 (quoting Harold Hongju
Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1085, 1129 (2002)).
218. See id. at 58 n.13.
219. Id. at 58.
220. Compare id. at 61 with Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98
AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 55 (2004). For an in-depth and enlightening rebuttal of the argument that using
international opinions in constitutional interpretation is appropriate and does not weaken federalism,
see Alford, supra note 122, at 61 n.30.
221. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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in finding the right kind of light—a cave viewed with a single flashlight
is a different experience from a cave viewed with full National Park
Service illumination. According to Alford, “[i]n the international legal
arena, where the Court has little or no expertise, the Court is unduly
susceptible to selective and incomplete presentations of the true state of
international and foreign affairs.”222 Attempts to systematize the use of
international norms have been made, but they ultimately fail for at least
four reasons: (1) it is difficult, if not impossible to determine true
international consensus on any point; (2) courts are structurally illequipped to research and make such determinations; (3) nations have
noncommensurate legal values; and (4) putative international norms may
be fundamentally repugnant to individual nations.223

222. Alford, supra note 122, at 64.
223. For instance, Professor Michael D. Ramsey proposed a four-step system: (1) carefully
define the legal theory at issue; (2) accept norms that restrict as well as enhance rights; (3) commit to
rigorous research in an effort to “Get the Facts Right”; and (4) “Avoid False Shortcuts to World
‘Consensus.’” Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on
Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 72–80 (2004).
However, Professor Ramsey wisely admits that his system is inherently unstable. For
instance, referring to the Lawrence decision’s citation to the European Court of Human Rights
opinion in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Professor Ramsey states, “[A]s a matter of legal
interpretation, there is no obvious connection between the U.S. Constitution and foreign court
opinions, which address the interpretation of different documents, written in different times and
different countries (and sometimes different languages).” Id. at 73. In the Lawrence decision, the
Court was faced with a fundamental rights analysis under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment—an analysis incommensurate with the ECHR’s concern in Dudgeon of whether
sodomy laws violate, and are not necessary to protect, the right to “privacy and family life” as
outlined in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. Thus, Ramsey’s first step (define the legal theory) is virtually impossible because the
texts and rights to be compared will rarely be similar enough. Id. at 74. Furthermore, Ramsey’s
analysis requires determinations of “importance”—a culturally bound determination with no logical
answer. Id. at 75. Ramsey also realizes that “there is no unified ‘world community’ with a simple
and easily accessible opinion to be had for the asking. There are only hundreds of societies, with
diverse and conflicting national practices, and billions of individuals and entities, each with its own
diverse and often inconsistent views.” Id. at 79. With all of these inherent weaknesses, Ramsey’s
methodology seems doomed and impractical. Even Ramsey admits that “commitment to [these]
guidelines
. . . will likely make the project unworkable in its broader applications.” Id. at 82.
Mark Tushnet has suggested another method of justifying the application of international
norms, including CIL norms, into U.S. law. In The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law,
108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1228 (1999), Tushnet argues for a system he calls “bricolage.” Under this
system, it is incumbent on lawyers to provide the judge with enough international justification for
their position. The judge may then use what she is given to reach the outcome she desires. Professor
Alford critiques this view by stating, “Under this theory, it is not that the Court is results oriented or
utilitarian; it is that the Court fundamentally lacks the institutional capacity to engage in proper
comparativism and unduly relies on advocacy at its peril.” Alford, supra note 122, at 65.
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Selective use of international norms ultimately equates to illogical
enhancement of rights.224 The availability of abortion in the United
States is an example of how international norms have not been used to
limit rights. According to Alford,
Since abortion was constitutionally guaranteed by Roe v. Wade in 1973,
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women has been ratified by over 170 states without any
provision for reproductive rights, and many countries have reaffirmed
severe government restrictions on such rights, with only a minority of
countries permitting abortion on demand.225

In short, the United States is arguably not in line with world
consensus on abortion rights. If judges may apply international norms
under CIL without congressional approval and if one of the purposes
advanced for doing such is that it would bring us more in line with the
world, then judges should also act to curtail abortion rights.
Given CIL’s source and potential breadth, it could turn into a
playground of judicial caprice if it were allowed to give rise to causes of
action without congressional or executive definition and guidance.
Judges are not trained to understand the laws of the entire world—we as
Daniel Bodansky, in a peremptory essay, offers further justifications for recent Supreme
Court invocations of international norms. He argues, ultimately unpersuasively, that the Constitution
incorporates international law, including CIL, and that federal courts may apply it. Daniel Bodansky,
The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 421, 423
(2004). While it is true that CIL has a place in U.S. law, Congress and the Executive have complete
control over its application. His argument that all courts in every nation are engaged in a “common
legal enterprise” is true only at the surface. Id. at 424. As Ramsey pointed out in his article,
apparently similar issues are fundamentally different and arguably incommensurate. Bodansky’s
third argument in favor of transplanting international norms into U.S. jurisprudence is that laws,
particularly the Constitution, are open-ended and courts must apply community standards. Id. at 425.
Once again, this argument is convincing only in broad generalities. Ultimately, this argument runs
afoul of the federalism principle that states have retained some degree of ultimate sovereignty.
Bodansky’s fourth and final justification is that incorporating international norms helps avoid
international friction. Id. at 427. While this is most likely true, it does not follow that courts should
have the power to implement international norms willy-nilly. The Constitution comprehends this
problem and gives power for averting it to the Legislature and the Executive. Unless we are willing
to ascribe Epimethean ineptitude to the Legislature and Executive and Athenian wisdom to the
judiciary, it seems unlikely that the Legislature will not consider relevant international norms in its
deliberations—something the Legislature’s multi-faceted voice is more well equipped to do in the
first place.
224. Alford, supra note 122, at 67 (“Put simply, international sources are proposed for
comparison only if they are viewed as rights enhancing. To the extent that a comparative analysis
supports government interests in lessening civil liberties—or at least certain civil liberties—
international sources will likely be ignored.”).
225. Id.
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humans can barely understand the laws of a single state or nation. As one
commentator put it, “[T]here is no unified ‘world community’ with a
simple and easily accessible opinion to be had for the asking. There are
only hundreds of societies, with diverse and conflicting national
practices, and billions of individuals and entities, each with its own
diverse and often inconsistent views.”226 If there were a federal judge
with a pet economic or social grievance, he or she could easily find
international support for their stance, no matter how absurd or abhorrent
to the average American. If judges were allowed such rein, then
Ambrose Bierce would be one step closer to being right—anything
would be lawful so long as it is “[c]ompatible with the will of a judge
having jurisdiction.”227
V. CONCLUSION
In biblical times, Solomon was wise enough to know that some
questions deserved a clear answer: For example, he knew that a child
could not grow up under the care of two mothers who both claimed
biological ties. Such an untenable situation would only create confusion
and discord among competing “sovereigns” and irreconcilable rules. One
mother—one “sovereign”—had to have control of the baby.
When faced with a similar situation, the U.S. Supreme Court did not
have Solomon’s rare wisdom. The language of the Alien Tort Statute,
when considered in its historical context and together with Erie,
mandated that there be one sovereign controlling the implementation of
customary international law. This sovereign was the U.S. Congress and
the President.228 Applying CIL-based norms to create federal common
law is inappropriate because, as Justice Scalia noted, “The notion that a
law of nations . . . can be used by a private citizen to control a
sovereign’s treatment of its own citizens within its own territory is a
20th-century invention of internationalist law professors and humanrights advocates.”229 Although the Court finally rejected Alvarez’s CILbased claim, it did so only after adopting an unstable method of
analysis—a method of analysis that leaves the door wide open to future
226. Ramsey, supra note 222, at 79.
227. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 108 (Oxford University Press 1999).
228. “We Americans have a method for making the laws that are over us. We elect
representatives to two Houses of Congress, each of which must enact the new law and present it for
the approval of a President, whom we also elect.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 749–50.
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CIL-based federal common law causes of action.230 All that will be
required is an artful attorney who can rustle up enough international
opinion to soothe five Supreme Court justices into feeling safe enough to
impose international opinions on U.S. citizens.
It was in allowing the possibility of future CIL-based court-created
causes of action that the Court split the proverbial baby. The Court has
allowed the possibility of multiple sovereigns creating causes of action.
Although legislative action would trump conflicting judicially created
causes of action, the mere possibility of a federal court recognizing such
a claim is cause for concern. Congress would be hard-pressed to
correctly stay abreast of federal court pronouncements of new and
evolving causes of action.
Brinton M. Wilkins

230. Speaking of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Justice Scalia argued, “Endorsing the very
formula that led the Ninth Circuit to its result in this case hardly seems to be a recipe for restraint in
the future.” Id. at 748.
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